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ABSTRACT
SUSANNA MAE RYCHLAK: Explaining the Decline in Fertility Rates in
Post-War Italy
(Under the direction of Dr. Susan Grayzel)
The aim of this thesis is to examine the decline in fertility rate in post-war Italy
and identify its causes. Fertility rate in Italy dropped dramatically across 1970-2010 in a
stark departure from the nation’s previous reproductive patterns. This has led to an
increasingly aging population, and holds important implications for Italy’s future.
This study demonstrates that there has been a meaningful shift in cultural values
that has led to fertility decline in Italy since 1970. In order to provide historical context
for the importance of this cultural shift, the thesis first presents the Italian culture and
familial structure of the twentieth century. Scholarly writings, fascist policies, and
Church teachings are used to demonstrate the traditional family ideology and pro-natalist
attitudes that permeated Italian culture in the first half of the twentieth century.
Following this, the thesis delves into a more comprehensive study of the 1960s
and 1970s, the decades that mark the beginning of fertility decline in Italy. It thus
examines the Italian women’s movement and the changes it spearheaded. Feminist texts,
changes in legislation, and popular survey data are employed to reveal shifting values
taking place during this time period. This evidence illuminates Italian women’s changing
attitudes towards family and gender relations and indicates that the 1960s and 1970s
witnessed the creation of new cultural values that would in turn influence Italian
women’s choices across the next four decades.
The thesis then provides an analysis of three factors in contemporary Italian
society and their relationship to fertility rate. An investigation of Italian women’s new
attitudes and behaviors in the realms of labor force participation, marriage, and division
of unpaid labor help to demonstrate the underlying causes of fertility decline: devaluation
of the traditional family structure. An exploration of continued structural barriers for
women in these areas demonstrates the ideological mismatch that has pushed Italian
women into an either/or relationship between a traditional family and personal autonomy.
Therefore, changing patterns in these realms are shown to spring from the same cause
that this thesis postulates has led to fertility decline in Italy: a meaningful shift in cultural
values.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO FERTILITY DECLINE

PROBLEM
The drop in fertility rate in Italy occurred suddenly. 1 In 1970, the average
number of children per Italian woman was 2.42; by 1980 this had fallen to 1.64, then in
1995 it reached its lowest point with 1.18, and in 2000 the rate was 1.26. In 2010 the
fertility rate was 1.4. The projected Italian fertility rate for 2014 is 1.42, establishing Italy
as having the 205th lowest fertility rate out of 231 nations. 2
It is notable that the Italian fertility rate is dramatically lower than that of
Northern Europe and other developed societies with access to the same reproductive
choices across the same time period. Italy’s declining fertility rate across the past four
decades has puzzled demographers and scholars alike due in large part to Italy’s history
of familism and Catholicism. The Catholic Church has long advocated families with
many children; therefore, it is surprising that Italy, where 88% of the population still self
identifies as Roman Catholic, has achieved one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. 3
An apt comparison is Ireland, which shares a familistic and Catholic heritage similar to
1

The number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing
years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates
2 "Total Fertility Rate in Italy." CIA World Factbook. 2014.
3 European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. European Values Survey 2008.
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that of Italy. Until the middle of the twentieth century, Italy had consistently higher rates
of fertility than Ireland; however the lowest fertility rate ever achieved in Ireland was 1.9
children per woman in 1994. 4 This rate is 61% higher than Italy’s lowest fertility rate in
1995, and the lowest point of Irish fertility is still 35% higher than Italy’s current fertility
rate.
This decrease in the number of children has already shifted the age demographics
within the nation. Today, 1 in every 5 people living in Italy is over the age of 65,
meaning around 20% of the population is elderly. In 1950, this ratio was 7.9 persons
under the age of 65 to every person over the age of 65. 5 The increase in the number of the
dependent and retired to the working population will put enormous strain on Italy’s
society and economy in the future. Indeed, in 2013, Italian deaths outstripped births,
with 10.01 deaths per 1,000 population and only 8.94 births. 6 This ratio of elderly to
non-elderly Italians is projected to continue to decrease and overall population is
expected to decline because Italian women are reproducing at well below the population
replacement rate of 2.1.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The low fertility rate in Italy is not only important because it represents a drastic
change from Italy’s past, but also because of its implications for the nation’s future.
Because fertility rate has consistently been below the replacement rate for several
decades, there will be an increasing number of retirees dependent on a smaller group of
workers in the labor force. This will put a massive strain on individual Italians as well as
“Total Fertility Rate in Ireland.” CIA World Factbook 2014.
“World Development Indicators.” Age dependency ratio, Italy. World Bank.
6 “World Development Indicators.” Total Birth Rate, Italy. World Bank.
4
5
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the nation’s economy in the near future. The importance of the effects of the change in
fertility rate in Italy has led to scholarly research as to why the change in fertility rate in
Italy has occurred.
The existing research on the topic of the change in fertility rates in Italy draws a
distinct connection between the increase in female labor force participation in Italy since
the late 1960s and a decrease in the number of children desired or considered practical by
Italian women and families. For example, in “Why are fertility and participation rates so
low in Italy (and Southern Europe?,” Daniela Del Boca demonstrates that both levels of
female higher education and female labor force participation rate have increased across
the same four decades in which fertility rate in Italy has declined. 7 She outlines the
nature of the Italian labor market and the factors that encourage working women to have
few or no children. For example, few part time employment opportunities, expensive
childcare, and difficult re-entry after a period of leave shape the argument that the labor
market in Italy is not economically conducive to having a large number of children. Her
article argues that an increase in female participation in the labor market has led to Italy’s
fertility decline.
In “Lowest-Low Fertility: Signs of Recovery in Italy?” Marcantonio Caltabiano,
Maria Castiglioni, and Alessandro Rosina also link education and female labor force
participation to fertility. 8 This study attributes high levels of female higher education
with the propensity of women to remain childless in Italy. The authors correlate
increases in female education to female involvement in the workforce in Italy. They cite

Del Boca, Daniela. "Why Are Fertility and Participation Rates so Low in Italy (and Southern
Europe)?" The Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America (2003).
8 Caltabiano, Marcantonio, Maria Castiglioni, and Alessandro Rosina. "Lowest-low Fertility: Signs of a
Recovery in Italy?" Demographic Research 21.23 (2009): 682-716.
7
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the primary motivation for many Italian women to postpone pregnancy as the desire to
attain a stable lifestyle and economic security prior to procreating. As a result, they argue,
increases in female education and economic autonomy have led to lowered fertility
because educated Italian women are choosing to postpone or forego childbearing.
Scholars and demographers have also presented young Italians’ dependence on
their parents as a cause of low fertility. Several studies have emphasized the way in
which these relationships have contributed to the low fertility rate. For example,
Massimo Livi-Bacci in “Too Few Children and too Much Family” demonstrates that
young Italians are waiting to move out of their parental homes until much older ages than
in the past. 9 This increased time of cohabitation between parents and adult children
results in these children making the transition into marriage and parenthood at a delayed
rate. Leaving the parental home later in life, he argues, causes Italian youth to begin the
steps to adulthood, including fertility choices, later in life and decreases the level of
fertility in the nation.
In “Italy: Delayed Adaptation of Social Institutions to Changes in Family
Behavior,” Alessandra De Rose, Filomena Racioppi, and Anna Laura Zanatta cite the
specific societal barriers for young people and women in Italy as limiting forces on
fertility. 10 This article examines how the current social and economic conditions of
Italian young adults serve to postpone all steps of family formation: i.e. leaving the
parental home, marriage, and fertility. Del Boca’s work emphasizes these factors as
barriers to working women’s fertility, but De Rose et al. take this a step further. 11 This

Livi-Bacci, Massimio. "Too Few Children Too Much Family." Daedalus 130.3 (2001): 139-55.
De Rose, Alessandra, Filomena Racioppi, and Anna Laura Zanatta. "Italy: Delayed Adaptation of
Social Institutions to Changes in Family Behaviour." Demographic Research 19 (2008): 665-704.
11 Del Boca, "Why Are Fertility and Participation Rates so Low in Italy (and Southern Europe)?"
9

10

4

study takes an integrated view of the ways in which Italian labor market and social
institutions not only influence fertility negatively once unions are formed, but also delay
the age at which Italians are choosing to enter into marriage.
Existing research has presented the correlation between increases in female labor
force participation rate, higher levels of female education, delayed departure from the
parental home, and the fertility rate in Italy. These elements aggregate to delay the age at
which Italian women choose to have children, and they limit the number of children
Italian families deem practical. Scholars have stressed the ways in which these factors
wield influence primarily through economic avenues.
The low fertility rate in Italy has been seen by other scholars and demographers as
a cultural shift as opposed to an economic one. Existing scholarly work also shows
support for the idea that it is not solely economic choices and the decrease in material
convenience of childbearing that have led to the change in fertility rate in Italy.
Alessandro Rosina and Romina Fraboni in “Is Marriage Losing its Centrality in
Italy?” put forth a theory of Second Demographic Transition as a contributing factor to
the decrease in fertility rate in Italy. 12 They underline that choices related to marriage
and motherhood among Italian women are tied to ideational changes. They argue that
fertility changes, therefore are a result of a large cultural shift in which Italian individuals
choose to value personal development and view traditional institutions with skepticism. 13
In “Childless or Childfree? Paths to Voluntary Childlessness in Italy,” Maria
Letizia Tanturri and Letizia Mencarini argue that the decline in Fertility Rate in Italy is

Rosina, Alessandro, and Romina Fraboni. "Is Marriage Losing Its Centrality in Italy?" Demographic
Research 11.6 (2004): 149-72.
13 Ibid.. 151.
12
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primarily an effect of the voluntary choice of women to have fewer or no children. 14
This study analyzes surveys carried out in five major urban areas of Italy and emphasizes
that Italian women have fewer children as the result of an active choice not to procreate.
Tanturri and Mencarini assert that it is not purely difficult economic conditions
associated with having children that have changed Italian women’s behavior, but instead
that there has been a change in the attitude of Italian women.
The answers gleaned from the survey questions indicate that Italian women who
remain voluntarily childless, specifically in urban areas, behave in sharp contrast to the
traditional idea of Italian motherhood. These women are less religious, more likely to
cohabitate before marriage, and participate in other non-conformist behavior. Welleducated women, then, according to survey results, find fulfillment in sources outside of
the family and childbearing and may even see parenthood as an obstacle to personal
achievement.
Ester Rizzi, Maya Judd, Michael White, Laura Bernardi, and David Kertzer in
“Familistic Attitudes, Dual Burden and Fertility Intentions in Italy” apply the crossnational demographic, Second Demographic Transition (“SDT”), to the Italian case. 15
They utilize a gendered definition and perspective of SDT taken from Eva Bernhardt’s
“Is the Second Demographic Transition a Useful Concept for Demography?”16 This
theory of SDT is characterized by an asymmetry in gender role obligations, and partially
as a consequence, an increase in divorce and cohabitation. In the second phase of this
14 Tanturri, Maria L., and Letizia Mencarini. "Childless or Childfree? Paths to Voluntary Childlessness
in Italy." Population and Development Review 34.1 (2008): 51-77.
15 Rizzi, Ester, Maya Judd, Michael White, Laura Bernardi, and David Kertzer. "Familistic Attitudes,
Dual Burden and Fertility Intentions in Italy." Annual Meeting of the Population Association of
America. Louisiana, New Orleans. 3 Apr. 2008. Lecture.
16 Bernhardt, Eva. "Is the Second Demographic Transition a Useful Concept for Demography?" Vienna
Yearbook of Population Research (2004): 25-28. Print.
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transition, Bernhardt says, “partnership and parenthood become strong positive options
for both men and women, which would imply less fragile male-female relationships and
the possibility of increasing fertility levels.” 17 The findings of this study indicate that
Italy could be in the midst of an incomplete Second Demographic Transition. As Italian
women increase their role in the workforce they are still faced with the expectation to
assume the traditional roles of housekeeping and childbearing, yet find it increasingly
difficult to fulfill both. The study concludes that an increase in gender equality,
particularly within Italian households, could significantly change fertility rates in the
future if the nation were to follow Bernhardt’s predicted trajectory of Second
Demographic Transition.
Scholars who have studied the change in fertility rate in Italy seem to have
divided themselves into two camps: those who support economic determinants of family
formation and those who support cultural determinants of family formation in Italy. In
“Italy’s Path to Very Low Fertility: The Adequacy of Economic and Second
Demographic Transition Theories,” David Kertzer, Michael J. White, Laura Bernardi,
and Guiseppe Gabrielli examine both of these perspectives and evaluate their explanatory
power for the low fertility rate in Italy. 18
Kertzer, et al. assert that female involvement in the workforce is an incomplete
explanation for the change in fertility rate in Italy. They argue that although it has been
adequately proven that working women in Italy delay marriage, delay childbirth, and
have fewer children overall, there must be further explanations as to why working women
17 Rizzi, Judd, White, Bernardi, Kertzer. "Familistic Attitudes, Dual Burden and Fertility Intentions in
Italy," 3.
18 Kertzer, David I., Michael J. White, Laura Bernardi, and Guiseppe Gabrielli. "Italy's Path to Very Low
Fertility: The Adequacy of Economic and Second Demographic Transition Theories." European
Journal of Population 25 (2008): 89-115.
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in Italy have children at a lower rate that women in other developed countries where there
has yet to be shown any greater government support for reconciling women’s work and
fertility. This study emphasizes the incompleteness of using Female Labor Force
Participation as the sole or primary factor in the change in fertility rate in Italy.
The authors also view fertility decline framed as Second Demographic Transition
as flawed. They argue that this cross-national theory inadequately addresses the unique
nature of the Italian case because the SDT is theorized to be the result of increased
individualization and secularization. Although there has been increased individualization
in Italy as shown through increases in divorce, cohabitation, and secularization, these
changes have not been to the degree of other developed nations, and certainly not to the
degree that would explain Italy having the lowest fertility rate among them. Indeed, in
“Is Marriage Losing its Centrality in Italy?” Rosina and Frobina conclude that, although
there has been an increase in cohabitation in Italy, it is not the result of a rejection of
marriage but instead cohabitation is used as a precursor to marriage. 19 In comparison to
most other Western societies, Italy is still very traditional, making SDT difficult to apply
to the Italian case, especially in a cross-country comparison.
The ultimate conclusion of Kertzer, et al’s study, however, underscores that
although cross-culturally the Female Labor Force Participation argument and SDT
theories seem to be weak, within the parameter of Italy they still have merit. The authors
believe that the influence of these factors could lend more explanatory power to the
Italian case if Italy’s specific economic and cultural context, for example issues such as
gender equity, were placed at the forefront. The study ends with an acknowledgment that
theories explaining the low fertility rate in Italy through Female Labor Force
19

Rosina and Fraboni, "Is Marriage Losing Its Centrality in Italy?"
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Participation Rate and Second Demographic Transition are not incorrect, but they are,
however, incomplete.

LACUNA
The majority of the studies conducted and theories produced to explain the
persistently low Fertility Rate in Italy since 1970 glaze over the fact that an increase of
women in the workforce and a diminished importance on having a large family is an
important and distinct cultural shift. The decision whether to reproduce and/or how many
children to have is not solely economic, nor is it merely the result of an overarching,
bodiless demographic evolution. Fertility choices are emotional, personal, and reflect the
values of Italian women, their families, and the society as a whole.
This thesis seeks to move beyond solely economic explanations of fertility
decline as well as cultural explanations that point solely to Second Demographic
Transition. The following chapters explore the shifting societal, institutional, economic,
and cultural forces at work across the past four decades specific to Italy and the role that
these factors have played in fertility decline.
The time period from 1970 to 2010 gave rise to a new field of choices for Italian
women and allowed them to embrace new roles beyond that of wife and mother to which
they had largely been confined during the first half of the twentieth century. This new set
of options allowed women to emerge as individual actors in the Italian economy, but the
Italian labor market has remained inflexible and unsupportive of women taking time off
to raise children, and attitudes about housework have continued to place the burden of
unpaid labor on women. Therefore, the past four decades have also witnessed an

9

increasing disconnect between women’s attitudes about childbearing/raising and the
realities as well as economic necessities of individuals and families in contemporary
Italy. From this, there has been a meaningful shift in cultural values in which Italians,
particularly women, have chosen to place diminished importance on the traditional family
structure and higher value on personal autonomy.
This examination of fertility decline in Italy will complicate existing theories by
demonstrating that the economic determinants of fertility choices are the result of a
meaningful cultural shift in Italy. The thesis seeks to prove that these changing cultural
attitudes serve as the root cause of fertility decline.

METHODOLOGY
This study primarily examines the time period from 1970 (fertility rate 2.43) until
2010 (fertility rate 1.4) in Italy. This period of time encompasses the years across which
the fertility rate in Italy changed consistently and dramatically. Additionally, 1970 marks
the year in which contraception was legalized in Italy, making it the first year in which
women had access to legal and reliable methods of family planning. Thus, since 1970
Italian women have had the ability to control more consciously the number of children
they wish to produce.
This study demonstrates that there has been a meaningful and lasting shift in
cultural values that has led to fertility decline in Italy since 1970. In order to set the stage
for the importance of this cultural shift, the thesis presents the traditional Italian culture

10

and familial structure of the twentieth century. This is done through an examination of
the role and influence of the fascist state and the Catholic Church on Italian family and
fertility. Scholarly writings, fascist policies, and Church teachings are used to
demonstrate the traditional family ideology and pro-natalist attitudes that permeated
Italian culture in the first half of the twentieth century.
Following this, the thesis delves into a more comprehensive study of the 1960s
and 1970s, the decades that mark the beginning of fertility decline in Italy. It thus
examines the Italian women’s movement and the changes it spearheaded. Feminist texts,
changes in legislation, and popular survey data are employed to reveal shifting values
taking place during this time period. This evidence illuminates Italian women’s changing
attitudes towards family and gender relations and indicates that the 1960s and 1970s
witnessed the creation of new cultural values that would in turn influence Italian
women’s choices across the next four decades.
The thesis then provides a detailed analysis of three factors in contemporary
Italian society and examines their relationship to fertility rate. An investigation of Italian
women’s new attitudes and behaviors in the realms of labor force participation, marriage,
and division of unpaid labor help to demonstrate the underlying causes of fertility
decline: devaluation of the traditional family structure. Across these areas of society, an
exploration of continued structural barriers for women demonstrates the ideological
mismatch that has emerged in Italy and pushed Italian women into an either/or
relationship between a traditional family and personal autonomy. Therefore, changing
patterns in these realms are shown to spring from the same cause that this thesis
postulates has led to fertility decline in Italy: a meaningful shift in cultural values.
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CHAPTER II
SETTING THE STAGE

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Fertility decline in Italy has been particularly surprising because of Italy’s
historically family-centric culture. Early twentieth century Italy was characterized by
couples’ adherence to the traditional family structure, meaning a domestic mother,
working father, and many children in a nuclear family situation. Additionally, two of the
most powerful institutions in twentieth century Italy, the Catholic Church and
Mussolini’s Fascist regime, reinforced familistic attitudes and promoted natalism.
Benito Mussolini led the Fascist Party that governed Italy from 1925 until 1943.
Throughout his rule, Mussolini maintained a vested interest in increasing the Italian
population. He believed that the nation’s strength derived from its number of inhabitants,
stating in his 1927 Ascension Day speech: “national demographic strength provides a
subsidiary but fundamental evidence of nations’ political as well as economic and civic
strength.” 1 The government sought to fend off the forces of secularization and
individualism that Mussolini perceived had led other European nations to low fertility in

Arianna Caporali & Antonio Golini. "Births and Fertility in Interwar Italy: Trends, Images, Policies
and Perception." Population Review (2010), 33.
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the early twentieth century. 2 In Fascist Italy, the ideal family was large and “had a
patriarchal structure based on the values of motherhood and fatherhood: the fascist
woman was a stay-at-home mother-wife faithful to the fascist cult of homeland.” 3
Mussolini’s government enacted a series of pro-natalist policies across his regime in
order to achieve this goal. Pro-natalist policies in fascist Italy fell into two categories:
measures that rewarded and encouraged procreation and those that punished individuals
who did not meet the government’s fertility standards.
In order to encourage large families, the state enacted policies that promoted
maternal and infant health, gave large families government subsidies and tax exemptions,
and created a new holiday: Day of the Mother and Child. 4 Punitive measures took the
form of newly created policies such a “bachelor tax” that unmarried men were required to
pay to the state. Other punitive measures excluded Italian women from the workforce in
order to encourage them to embrace roles as solely wives and mothers. In 1923 women
were eliminated from competing in public service sector of employment, and, in 1938,
the government mandated that non-state offices could have no more than 10% female
employees. 5 More directly, Mussolini’s regime attempted to manipulate women’s
choices and push them towards fertility by making abortion and the distribution of
contraception (or even information regarding contraception) illegal in 1927. In 1930 the
state further penalized women who engaged in non-productive behaviors by recategorizing abortion and contraception as “crimes against the race.” 6

Ibid., 34.
Caporali & Antonio Golini. "Births and Fertility in Interwar Italy: Trends, Images, Policies and
Perception." 39.
4 Ibid., 39.
5 Ibid., 37.
6 Ibid., 37.
2
3
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Il Duce found an ally for his policies promoting traditional gender roles and
natalism in the Catholic Church. Italy has strong historical and cultural ties to the
Catholic Church, with the papacy located in the heart of Rome and the overwhelming
majority of the Italian population identifying as Catholic. Therefore, attitudes that were
shared between the Church and the government in the early twentieth century wielded
great societal influence. Throughout its history, the Catholic Church has condemned
abortion and the use of any form of contraception, and the papacy celebrated their
illegalization by Mussolini. 7 Additionally, Catholic theology during this time echoed the
state’s views on women’s roles in society. Pope Pius XI, head of the Catholic Church
from 1922 to 1939, described women’s work outside of the home as a perversion of the
family, and he urged women to assume solely the role of a wife and mother. 8 Although
the Italian Fascist State would not meet its goal of an average of six children per woman,
fertility rates in Italy remained high compared to other European counterparts throughout
the duration of fascist rule.

DECADES OF CHANGE
Emerging from the Second World War and the cloud of fascism, the Italian family
of the mid twentieth century remained rooted in tradition and maintained relative
consistency in fertility patterns. In the two and a half decades after the fall of fascism,
the end of the war, and the creation of the Italian Republic there were small fluctuations
in total fertility rate from year-to-year, but overall it held at relatively consistent rate: an

Jeff Pratt , "Catholic Culture." Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction. Comp. David Forgacs and
Robert Lumley (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996. 129-42), 134.
8 Ibid., 136.
7
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average of 2.47 women per child. 9 Aspects of what would be considered the “traditional
Italian family” were still very prevalent. Catholic culture remained incredibly influential
in post-war Italy, especially within the realm of the family. Jeff Pratt addresses this in his
article “Catholic Culture,” stating: “The [Catholic] Church has consistently stressed the
special quality of relations within the family, and these teachings, which became an
important theme in post-war political life, were widely shared. They represent the basic
axioms which generated judgments about how people behave in the personal domain.” 10
The teachings of the Church regarding the family continued to stress the
importance of the traditional family structure, specifically the role of the woman
primarily and solely as wife and mother, a patriarchal household with the father as the
clear head of house, many children, and an absolute prohibition on birth control. In 1946,
Pope Pius XII reiterated his predecessor in his description of the ideal role of Catholic
women: “Every woman is destined to be a mother […] For true women, all of life’s
problems are understood in terms of the family […] Equality with men, outside the home
where she is queen, subjects the woman to the same burdens the man has.” 11 The
function and importance of women from the perspective of the Catholic Church was
solely through their relationships to “the family,” i.e., with their husbands and children.
In the post-war years, female labor force participation rate across the Italian
peninsula continued to stagnate behind other European and Western nations. As women
in other nations made strides in the workforce, Italian women remained overwhelmingly

"World Development Indicators." Total Fertility Rate, Italy. World Bank.
Pratt , "Catholic Culture." 145.
11 Anna Maria Mozzoni. "Feminism as Eighteenth-Century Individualism." Sex and Power: The Rise of
Women in America, Russia, Sweden, and Italy. By Donald B. Meyer. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP,
1987), 141.
9

10
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confined to the home. Similar to the Catholic Church, the Italian legal system during this
time viewed women not as individual actors, but through their relationships to men.
Continued gender inequality in the Italian legal and familial infrastructure gave
rise to the Italian feminist movement in the late 1960s. Similar women’s movements
occurred in United States and in other European nations; however, Italian feminism was a
case all its own because it illuminated the specific challenges, prejudices, and obstacles
that Italian women of this time faced. A close examination of the Italian case reveals that
this women’s movement was born from drastic and continued gender inequality
particularly within the family. Women began to agitate for change in the nature of
relationships between husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, and the overall family
structure. One finds this reflected in the language and demands of feminist texts,
legislative reform, and ultimately changing family and fertility patterns.
The language employed during the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s
demonstrates a demand for changing a culture hostile to women. Rhetoric such as
“opposition,” “autonomy of women,” and “liberation” emphasize that the women’s
movement not only viewed itself as fighting for female equality, but also against many
social and cultural institutions that maintained Italy’s patriarchal societal infrastructure. 12
The message of the feminist movement of this time period held vast cultural implications.
In a nation that had across the twentieth century consistently reinforced the concept of a
traditional, patriarchal family as the norm, new ideas began rapidly to spread. In her
work Liberazione della donna, Luca Chiavola Birnbaum denotes the particular way that
Italian feminists confronted this culture: “the word culture was employed in rejection of

Lucia C. Birnbaum, Liberazione Della Donna: Feminism in Italy. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP,
1986), 82
12
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patriarchal, bourgeois, and masculine culture and in affirmation of a new way to make
culture with self determination and self management of women.” 13 Italian women of the
1960s and 1970s increasingly shunned the traditional sources of authority and the way in
which their culture demanded women behave.
Feminist publications from this time period emphasized the connection between
patriarchy within society and inequality inside of the family. Writings such as Carla
Lonzi’s widely influential work Sputiamo su Hegel (Let’s Spit on Hegel) circulated in the
streets of Rome and Milan in the 1970s, and presented the nature and structure of the
Italian family as significant impediments to female progress. She asserted that “Marriage
is an institution that subordinates women to male destiny” 14 and further expanded that
“The family is the capstone of the patriarchal system, founded not only on the economic
interest but also on the psychological needs of men.” 15 Lonzi’s writings were widely
read, and they spurred further exploration of the status of Italian women within the
family.
Feminist texts of this time also explored the inherent patriarchal nature of
maternity and motherhood. The manifesto of Rivolta Femminile (Female Revolt), a
Rome based feminist group founded in 1970, argues that the time that a woman enters
into motherhood is the time she loses her individual freedom. The manifesto outlines the
flawed ideology at the root of the Italian family to make its case:

Woman’s first reason for resentment against society lies in being
forced to face maternity as a dilemma. We denounce the unnatural
Ibid., 82.
Carla Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel. La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale e altri scritti, (1970), 12 (As
cited in Birnbaum, Liberazione Della Donna, 84).
15 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel. La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale e altri scritti, 33 (As cited in
Birnbaum, Liberazione Della Donna, 85).
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state of maternity paid for at the cost of exclusion. […] We do not
wish to think about motherhood all our lives or to continue to be
unwitting instruments of patriarchal power. Woman is fed up with
bringing up a son who will turn into a bad lover 16
Lonzi (who was a member of Rivolta Femminile) also addresses the constraints of
motherhood and goes on to clarify the ways in which the feminist movement views
maternity as a type of “forced self sacrifice.” She writes, “We are not responsible for
giving birth to humanity in our slavery. It is not the son that made us into slaves, but the
father.” 17 Thus, her opposition to maternity does not stem from a rejection of
motherhood or maternal love, but instead from an opposition to patriarchal familial
structure. She emphasizes that although woman has been tasked with the responsibility to
repopulate the world, that women should no longer be responsible to trade in their
freedom for motherhood, and that this choice has been forced upon women through the
male dominated structure of the Italian family. In addition to the burden of maternity, the
writings of Rivolta Femminile emphasize that the patriarchal structure of the family has
enslaved women to housework and limits the ability of women to enter the waged
workforce.
It could be argued that the writing of feminist manifestos represented the most
extreme verbalization of women’s protest of their cultural inequality; however,
statements that might seem inflammatory were especially valid in the Italian case. Even
though women had been granted the right to vote in 1946 in return for their contributions
to the war and resistance effort, many patriarchal and blatantly unequal laws bled over
from the fascist penal code onto the books of the newly created Italian Republic.
Rivolta Femminile, Manifesto (1970) (As Cited in: Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp. Italian Feminist
Thought: A Reader. Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell (1991), 39.
17 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel. La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale e altri scritti (As cited in Bono &
Kemp, Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader, 50).
16

18

Statements equating marriage with women’s subordination were justifiable in a society
where until 1968 a simple testimony by a husband that his wife was committing adultery
would lead to her imprisonment for a year, but a similar act by a husband held no
punishment. 18 Equality of spouses within marriage was not established until 1975 in
Italy. 19 Also, divorce was nearly impossible in Italy at this time, so for both parties there
was no possibility to regain freedom if marital relations turned sour.
Additionally, in the early and mid 1960s the Italian legal code ensured that
women had little or no access to birth control or abortion. The inability of Italian women
to control their own fertility choices left them in a subjugated position within society and
the family. Although individual women may not have labeled themselves as feminists,
there was an undeniable dissemination of feminist consciousness. The issues upon which
the majority of feminist texts focused: desire to make their own choices about sexuality
and motherhood, and constraints of the traditional family structure did not fall on deaf
ears. Soon Italian women’s demands would lead instances of tangible reform. The year
1968 would mark a turning point for Italian women, and, ultimately, the fertility patterns
of the nation for the next four decades.
The modification of Italian individual and familial life during this time period was
not limited to evolution of individuals’ opinions, ideas, and values. The late 1960s and
1970s marked a crucial time for the modification of Italian legislation. These changes,
spurred by the women’s movement, can be seen as both the consequence of and a catalyst
for the roots of modern Italian cultural values. 20 Essential to gauging the effectiveness
and widespread nature of the Italian women’s movement during this time are three
18
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particularly significant pieces of legislation passed between 1968 and 1978. These
reforms: the legalization of divorce, the legalization of birth control, and the legalization
of abortion, reflected the success of the women’s movement and aided women’s societal
advancement across the peninsula. Understanding the circumstances that led to the
enactment of these laws, their implementation, and, in two cases, their challenge through
public referendum, further reveals shifting societal and cultural values during this time
period.
The first of these pieces of legislation passed by the Italian government was the
legalization of divorce. This reform took place in 1970, the year in which total fertility
rate in Italy began its rapid decline. The divorce bill, as approved by the Italian
parliament in 1970, allowed for consensual divorce without requiring a reason to be
stated. 21 This was a direct challenge to traditional Church teachings that held marriage as
a sacred union unable to be dissolved. Again, Birnbaum notes, “The right of divorce,
gained much earlier in Protestant countries, marked a momentous change in Italy.” 22
Immediately following the bill’s passage, the conservative Christian Democrats, with the
support of the Church, mobilized to repeal the law through a popular referendum. On
May 12, 1974, 90 percent of the Italian population flocked to the polls to cast its vote on
the divorce law. Participants in the referendum upheld the new divorce law with 60
percent of voters supporting it, in what would be called an “earthquake vote” for Italy. 23
The divorce referendum sheds a spotlight on an even more important issue than
the upholding of the legislation. The referendum results reveal the changing values of

21 This “no blame” provision is counterbalanced by a minimum legal separation of five years, since
the law’s passage this time has been reduced to three years.
22 Birnbaum, Liberazione Della Donna, 103.
23Ibid., 114.

20

Italians in general and Italian women in particular. In a departure from even a few
decades prior to 1974, the Italian population made known that it would not
unquestioningly follow Church authority on issues of the family. 24 In “Feminism as
Eighteenth-Century Individualism,” Anna Maria Mozzoni suggests that this time period
marked a growing consciousness among Italian women in the absence of fascist ideology
and in the waning influence of the Catholic Church on the individual. She states, “The
victory of the prodivorce voters in the 1974 referendum registered, for the first time in the
history of united Italy, the voice of people no longer under tutelage […] women had
unquestionably determined the result and had listened only to themselves.” 25 Women
were rising up as independent agents and autonomous voters for the first time, and these
changes manifested themselves in both legislation and societal practice.
Similar to the case of divorce, the two most powerful institutions in twentieth
century Italy, the Catholic Church and the Fascist regime, had long denounced birth
control. At its formation in 1946, the Italian Republic maintained prohibitions on the
distribution of contraception and access to information about it, and Italian women
remained unable to access legal birth control. 26 In 1964, the Italian Supreme Court
rejected the legalization of contraception in a case that was brought before it, claiming
that birth control was a violation of public morals. 27 Six years later, in 1970, a case
against birth control clinics that had been illegally established by activists in Rome and
Milan came before the Italian Supreme Court again. This time, however, the court

Ibid., 115.
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reversed its ruling, allowing dissemination of contraceptive information in Italy and its
legal and public availability for the first time. 28
Women now possessed the ability to control their own fertility for the first time in
Italy’s history. The emergence and growing strength of the women’s movement during
the six-year interim between the two above court cases is indicative of a changing
society. The court’s about-face from interpreting birth control as an immoral vice to
referencing its prohibition as an antiquated piece of fascist legislation was a shift
mirrored by the populous. The Church, however, had not changed its insistence that the
purpose of all sexual acts should be procreation. In his 1968 Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul
VI condemned "any action which, either in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its
accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as
an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible." 29 From 1970 onward, however,
Italy would witness a steady decline in total fertility rate to one of the lowest in the
world; a feat that would not have been possible without the rejection of some Catholic
teachings and the embracing of contraception.
The final piece of legislation that was passed during this time period is perhaps
the most revealing of Italy’s changing society and cultural values. The criminalization of
abortion in Italy dated back to Italy’s first modern penal code, adopted in 1889, but the
consciousness of abortion as a crime existed in the peninsula long before its unification.
Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1532 declared abortion to be homicide, and the
Catholic Church long asserted its view of abortion as a mortal sin. After being codified
in 1889, the criminal nature of abortion was reasserted in the 1930 Codice Rocco (Rocco
Ibid., 41.
Paul VI. Humanae Vitae: Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pope Paul VI on the Regulation of Births.
(Encyclicals of Holy Father of Paul VI, 1968, www.vatican.va).
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Code) penal code of the Fascist regime, and the prohibition on abortion continued to
stand as law after creation of the Italian Republic in 1946. 30
Comprehending the combination of Roman, Fascist, and Christian traditions in
the view of abortion as a criminal act is essential to understanding why its legalization
marks such a stark transformation in Italian legislation and society. The debate and public
discourse surrounding the legalization of abortion marked and solidified the recognition
of women as individual agents in Italian society. In “Debates and Controversies on
Abortion in Italy,” Mariana Calloni states: “The debate on abortion also permitted the
emergence of new female identities, the recognition of the centrality of women as a
political subject, and the affirmation of feminism as a public discourse.” 31
In 1978, responding to the demands of the women’s movement, the Italian
legislature passed Norme per la Tutela Sociale della Maternita e sull’Interruzione
Volontaria della Gravidanza (Norms for the Social Protection of Motherhood and about
the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy). 32 This legislation did not completely
decriminalize abortion in all cases, but it marked a significant change in the existing
criminal code in that it allowed for a number of circumstances that permitted legal
abortion. As soon as it was constitutionally permissible, groups opposed to the
legalization of abortion proposed popular referendums to nullify the legislation and
restrict abortion to cases where it was “therapeutically necessary.” This “necessity”
would have to be determined by physicians, and not by individual women seeking
abortions. The Catholic Church and conservative political parties were the primary
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forces behind this referendum, and they poured vast resources into attempts to persuade
the public to overturn the law. 33
With a 79% voter turnout, the Italian electorate overwhelmingly upheld the
legislation on the legalization of abortion, with 60% voting against the law’s overturn and
only 32% for it (7.7% of ballots were blank on this issue or invalid 34). 35 Moreover, the
referendum to repeal the legalization of abortion began on May 17, a mere four days after
an assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. The threat on this pope, widely beloved
and respected by the Italian people, and who had directly pleaded with the Italian people
to support the referendum, could still not tip the scale for repeal. This demonstrated the
ways in which the women’s movement, secularization, and new cultural values of
individualism were emerging as an stronger influence than more traditional societal
institutions within Italy.
Rates of abortion in Italy during this time, and in the decades to follow, remained
comparatively low; however, “the right of a woman to her own body as the capstone of
her liberation” 36 was a widely disseminated idea that had taken root and now had tangible
consequences. There was a new consciousness in the Italian electorate, and a new set of
cultural values that not only steered votes, but societal practices. Women emerged as not
only capable of acting as independent agents, but also demanding of autonomy. These
referendums demonstrated that when presented with a choice, Italian women were
rejecting the constraints of the traditional family structure.
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Although a tempting interpretation, Italian feminism should not be viewed as a
fringe movement. Birnbaum notes, “Only a minority of Italy’s twenty-seven million
women walked in feminist demonstrations, but they drew the attention of a wide
audience.” 37 In the 1960s and 1970s there is evidence to suggest a new female
consciousness emerging across the peninsula as seen in new laws and in attitudes.
For example, an examination of several Europe-wide surveys conducted during
the 1970s presents compelling evidence to suggest that Italian women’s attitudes towards
their role in society, particularly within the scope of the family, were shifting within
female population as a whole. 38 “Euro-barometer 3: European Men and Women,” which
was conducted in 1975, asked: “What do you think is the main reason women have less
opportunity [than men of the same age to succeed in life in Italy?]” Italian women
responded to this question by selecting “family commitments” at more than twice the rate
of any of the other options presented (38.9%; in comparison to the Europe-wide average
response of 32.3% to this question). 39

Birnbaum, Liberazione Della Donna, 114.
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Figure 1: “Why do women have less?” - Euro-barometer 3: European Men and Women, 1975 40

Italian women’s responses to this question demonstrate that during the time of the
women’s movement and when fertility rate first began to decline, Italian women
recognized that the confines of the traditional family structure led to personal limitations
for women. Additionally, women cited male attitudes [towards women] as the second
most limiting factor in Italy. In contrast, women cited educational limitations and
limitations deriving from the inherent female nature as having a much lower influence on
their unequal place in society. Thus, the unequal family structure and the male
chauvinism highlighted within feminist texts find echoes in the female population during
this time period.
Another enlightening indicator comes from responses to a question that was posed
to respondents as a part of a slightly later Eurobarometer survey in 1977. Male and
female participants answered the question, “Do you believe that the majority of women
would like to see fewer differences between the respective roles of men and women in
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society?” as follows. Italians overwhelmingly responded that women would prefer to
have fewer differences from men, with 85% of respondents stating yes (compared to the
81% Europe-wide average). This group then answered whether they believed that men
would prefer to have fewer differences between the sexes in Italy. Over 72% of Italians
believed that men would not like to see fewer differences—nearly a 10% higher rate than
the average for all European countries surveyed.
It is possible to interpret these suggestive responses in several ways. The first and
most obvious being that one may infer that during this time, Italian men and women
perceived women as having a very strong desire for greater equality, and therefore having
high dissatisfaction with the current state of gender relations on the peninsula.
Additionally, it can be interpreted that Italian men and women overwhelmingly believed
that men did not want the status of women to become more equal, and therefore
perceived men as having a high rate of satisfaction in the state of gender roles and
relations. Overall, this indicates a cultural environment that was favorable to men and
one that was unfavorable to women— a status quo to which these respondents were
acutely aware. 42
There is also evidence that suggests Italian housewives were the unhappiest of all
of their European counterparts. Responses to questions regarding life as a housewife
applied to a large swath of the women in 1977 Italy. During this time only 29% of Italian
women worked in the waged labor force, therefore, housewives’ responses demonstrate
attitudes of the largest portion of the female population. 43 When women who described

42 European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. Eurobarometer 8: Men,
Women, and Work Roles in Europe. 1977.
43 “Labor Force Participation Rate for Women in Italy.” U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics. International Comparisons of Annual Labor Force Statistics.
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themselves as “housewives” ranked their satisfaction on a scale from 1 (completely
dissatisfied) to 11 (very satisfied) Italy produced the second highest percentage of women
who labeled themselves as “completely dissatisfied” (8.1% compared to Europe-wide
3.4%) Italy further saw the lowest number of women who categorized themselves as
“very satisfied” in their role as housewives (19% compared to 31.4% Europe-average).
The 1977 results reveal that less than half of all Italian housewives ranked their personal
satisfaction as above a six on the aforementioned scale, while the average satisfaction of
housewives for all European countries surveyed above this level constituted 69.8%. 44
Italian housewives, the most populous female occupation in 1977 Italy, were
comparatively very dissatisfied with their lives.
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Italian women’s responses to these surveys suggest that they saw the constraints
of the traditional family structure as having a directly limiting force on their personal
European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. Eurobarometer 8: Men,
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autonomy and, in many cases, quality of life. Additionally, women professed a desire to
change the cultural landscape so they could achieve a more equal status, while men, in
general, were still opposed to increased equality. Finally, Italian women who were
homemakers professed high rates of dissatisfaction. The entrenched social and familial
inequalities criticized by the Italian feminist movement, therefore were concerns echoed
by women across the peninsula. Italian women of this time identified the traditional,
patriarchal family structure as a limitation and a burden: one that they were increasingly
disinclined to bear.
The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed Italians beginning to shake off ideological
influences that had previously determined familial and societal roles. In this new space,
aided by the feminist movement, Italian women found a voice to pinpoint and change the
some of the patriarchal qualities that continued to pervade the realms of family life and
female sexuality. Women finally achieved the ability to control their role in marriage and
family through divorce, and availability of legal contraception and safe abortion meant
that Italian women had the opportunity to control their sexuality and fertility for the first
time. The upholding of legalized divorce and abortion through popular referendum
further demonstrated that these legal changes reflected shifting Italian societal values.
Therefore, new pieces of legislation in the 1970s provided women a new set of choices to
match their new ideologies.
The effects of this change in consciousness can be seen in the changing family
and fertility practices of Italian women in the following four decades. Discussing the
new Italian society and new Italian women that emerged from this tumultuous time
period in her qualitative study Journeys Among Women, Judith Hellman observes that the
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changing attitudes towards girls and boys are most indicative of society’s transformation
of consciousness. She notes a loosening link between sexuality and family creation,
arguing that Italian youth view access to family planning, contraception, and safe
abortion as basic rights. In addition to this, she emphasizes the incredible power that the
women’s movement had on public acceptance and normalization of women working
outside of the home. In addition to this changing perception, she finds that “mothers of
young women entering the workforce support their daughters’ hopes of finding a job
before they marry […] both for reasons of personal autonomy and for reasons of personal
and family ‘insurance.’” 46 The Italian society that emerged at the end of the 1970s was
markedly different to the one that had entered it.
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CHAPTER III
A CHANGED CULTURE

THE MODERN ITALIAN WOMAN
Antonella lives in the small hilltop town of Perugia in central Italy. Originally
from Naples, her passion for literature and journalism led her from her hometown
university to a PhD from Yale in Italian language and literature. Returning to Italy, she
worked as a journalist for a few years, but soon chose to marry and settle down in her
husband’s hometown of Perugia when she was in her early 30s. She still writes freelance
for several newspapers, but her primary job now is instructing American students
studying abroad about contemporary Italy. She teaches only a few classes a day, giving
her the time and flexibility to cook homemade meals (which are a source of immense
pride for her), clean, check in on her husband’s parents who live nearby, and attend to her
young daughter. Like many women of her generation, she has only one child: Valentina,
to whom she gave birth when she was 36. 1
Antonella’s biography reads similarly to that of many Italian women of her
generation. With a 25 percent rate of higher education and a labor force participation rate
of 47 percent, the modern Italian woman looks and behaves very differently from her pre1970 counterpart. If she chooses to marry it is, on average, when she is 30 or over, and if
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she chooses to have children, she does not normally give birth for the first time until she
is almost 31. Finally, in a drastic departure from traditional practices, and as the result of
a steady decline in fertility, the modern Italian woman, on average, has 1.4 children. 2
The Italian populace and those who govern it are acutely aware of the current
state of low fertility and the looming problems that accompany this trend. The economic
and societal impact of the graying population is a source of anxiety not only for
individuals, but also for the Italian state. Indicators of replacement anxiety permeate
daily life for Italian men and women. The small city of Laviano in the South of Italy,
which faces an incredibly low number of children born each year and a stagnating
primary school system, began offering 10,000 euros to any woman, Italian native or
immigrant, who bore a child in the town and enrolled it in the first grade. 3 Official state
publications throughout Italy encouraging women to have more children and at a younger
age are not difficult to find.
Government agencies utilize modern media outreach such as digital videos to
promote the idea of increasing fertility to Italian women. For example, there is a
YouTube series from September 2008 in which the head of the Italian Gynecological and
Obstetrical Society (SIGO), Giorgio Vittori, urges Italian women to conserve their
fertility, and to be aware that the longer they wait to bear children, the more difficult
fertility will be. SIGO publications have been steadily shifting across the past three
decades from outreach that promotes sexual responsibility through education about
sexually transmitted diseases, responsible use of contraception, and health and wellbeing
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during pregnancy towards an approach that aggressively advocates fertility. 4 In this
digital video series, Vittori warns women that prioritizing their career could put them in a
situation where they are unable to conceive by the time they reach their personal goals.
He states, “It is important to know that at 37 years old you may very well have a great
job, a beautiful home, a great trousseau, but remember that the available oocytes are
very, very few. Remember it, think ahead.” 5 Through publications such as this, the
Italian government reveals a vested interest in educating women about their fertility, but
places a heightened emphasis on prioritizing their ability to procreate. 6
Within Italy many overlapping voices contribute to the discourse of Italian’s
reproductive anxiety. Although these narratives pinpoint the same issues, their origins,
perspectives, and solutions clash. Many contemporary Italian women and feminist
thinkers take issue with the alarmist discourse surrounding low fertility. The state’s
narrative often blames women for their seeming unwillingness to have children and
insinuates that fertility decline stems from women’s laziness and reluctance to take on the
responsibility. Rebutting this, women assert that low fertility rate is a social problem,
and represents “a further example of the failures of neoliberal and misogynist policies.” 7
These women acknowledge the connection between Italian women’s diminished
desire to have children and the drop in Italy’s fertility rate; however, their perspective
diverges from that of the state by arguing that Italian institutions and practices have failed
to evolve in a way that allows women to both have children and an autonomous lifestyle.
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Although modern Italian women have more options for individual success than their pre1970 counterparts, they are forced into perceived dichotomous decisions due to
ideological societal barriers that make it incredibly difficult for them to achieve an
education, a career, and a family. From this perspective, Italy’s particular societal
infrastructure is implicated for the role that it plays in maintaining the inability to
reconcile individual autonomy and fertility.
The voice of the contemporary Italian woman facing these struggles can be heard
through sources such as the popular blog The 27th hour (La 27ora). 8 The blog’s name
derives from a well-known Italian study that added up the combination of unpaid and
paid labor completed each day by Italian women only to find that it would take 27 hours.
The articles that appear on The 27th Hour are written by Italian women and reveal modern
cultural and societal conditions that have given rise to a new slew of women’s issues.
The 27th Hour’s description immediately pinpoints many of the unique challenges faced
by Italian women:
“The 27th hour is a blog for women: it tells the stories and ideas of those chasing
a balance between work (whether in the office or at home), family,
themselves […] Stretching a public-private border that is becoming more
flexible. Multitasking, by choice and /or by force. Career prospects and desire for
motherhood; parents bringing up children, and children who care for aging
parents […] These are daily negotiations that generate common doubts and
personal solutions. Here we try to offer and exchange news, tips, reflections and
serious reading. Chasing a free society where everyone can grow in mutual
respect.” 9
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The blog and its affiliated articles emphasize the difficult daily dichotomies that Italian
women face, such as: balancing career and motherhood, caring for children and caring for
parents, and work in the home and work in their careers.
Articles such as “Letter to a Child who will Never Be Born” and “No Kids and
No Regrets: The Debate on a Full Life” address the difficulties of maintaining a career
and/or a home along with having children; however, in contrast to the state’s oft implied
stance, they do not view low fertility rate as a result of women’s laziness or unwillingness
of to accept the responsibilities of motherhood. Instead, the authors target institutional
barriers that have forced them to choose between career and family, children and
autonomy.
This chapter will examine the relationships between the Italian fertility rate and
the new set of choices that Italian women, couples, and society have faced across the past
four decades. The following sections will outline shifting societal conditions as well as
stagnant ideological infrastructures in Italy that have framed women’s fertility choices
since 1970. An examination of female participation in the work force, changing marriage
patterns, and the gendered division of unpaid labor will help to reveal what has caused
Italian women to choose different options than in the past. The causes and results of
these new choices will demonstrate evidence of a meaningful shift in cultural values that
has resulted in Italy’s fertility decline.

EDUCATION, LABOR, AND NEW SET OF CHOICES
Several distinct circumstances connect the increase in the education of women
and female labor force participation in Italy and the decline in the number of children
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desired or considered practical by Italian women and families. Italian women have
steadily achieved higher levels of education across the past four decades and have served
a resultingly greater role in the Italian workforce. 10 These factors have undergone
significant augmentation across the same time period in which fertility rate has
decreased. Existing literature on Italy’s fertility decline has drawn correlations between
increase in female employment, education, and decline in fertility rate. Many of the
studies, however, attribute these increases in education and employment as mere causes
of low fertility when they can be viewed more accurately as effects of the same cultural
shift in values that has caused it.
Emerging from the transformative decade of the 1970s, female rates of higher
education and labor force participation rate steadily grew in Italy. In 1970, the year that
marked the beginning of its dramatic fertility decline, 26.4% of Italian women engaged in
paid labor outside of the home. This number was low, but at the time was comparable to
European counterparts. By 1975, female participation in the paid labor market had
increased marginally to 26.8%. 11 During these years the women’s movement gained
momentum, and Italian institutions enacted important female-friendly reforms such as the
legalization of divorce, birth control, and abortion.
During this time of changing societal attitudes and legal structures towards
family and children, there was also a demonstrated shift in Italian women’s view of work
outside of the home. These shifting labor patterns indicate that the increase in female
labor force participation was born from the same forces that shaped the new face of the
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Italian family. In “Lowest-Low Fertility. Signs of Recovery in Italy?” Marcantonio
Caltabiano, Maria Castiglioni, and Alessandro Rosina note the developing friction
between work and family for women of this time period. They asseverate that for these
women, “higher personal expectations, developed alongside of greater levels education,
contrasted with a more traditional environment (i.e. with regard to family patterns, gender
roles, and work time management) and may have ultimately polarized work and
family.” 12 These forces developed in tandem as effects of changing societal values.
Although there has been scholarly and analytical proof of the connection between female
labor force participation rate and declining fertility rate, both issues emerge from
women’s rejection of the traditional family structure.
Surveys conducted by Eurobarometer in 1975 and 1983 reveal Italian men and
women’s shifting attitudes towards women in the workforce. Although barely a quarter
of women engaged in paid labor outside of the home in 1975 (TFR 2.17), when asked the
question “Would you prefer to be in paid employment or not?” 67.65% of women
responded that they would like to work outside of the home. This was countered,
however, by 55.6% of women responding that their husbands would prefer for them to
not be in paid employment. 13 In 1983 (TFR 1.51), the total female labor force
participation rate in Italy had climbed only 3.7 percentage points to 30.5% of women. 14
However, there is evidence that women’s attitudes towards individual participation in the
labor force had grown more receptive. In 1983, 83.5% of women responded that they
would prefer to work in paid employment, with 42.6% of women responding that their
Del Boca, "Why Are Fertility and Participation Rates so Low in Italy (and Southern Europe)?"
European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. Euro-barometer 3:
European Men and Women. 1975.
14 “Labor Force Participation Rate for Women in Italy.” U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics. International Comparisons of Annual Labor Force Statistics.
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husbands would prefer for them not to work outside of the home. 15 This shift indicates
that women increasingly desired to participate in the labor market, which reflects a
growing desire for independence and individual achievement. This is contrasted by a
large percentage of married men would like for their wives to remain jobless even if their
wives wished enter into the waged workforce. These responses reveal that the traditional
family structure imposed, or at least sought to impose, limitations on women’s autonomy.
Italian women not only expressed a strong desire to participate in the paid
workforce in the early years of fertility decline, they were also actively regretful when
they chose to forego employment. In surveys across the 1970s, Italian women
consistently expressed regret for not working at a much higher rate than the average
responses of their European compatriots. 16 In 1983, only two other nations fell within 10
percentage points of women who “often” regret not working, these being Greece with
34.5% and France with 25.6%. When combined, Italy possessed the highest percentage
of women who “often regret” and “sometimes regret” not working (57.1%).
Additionally, Italy possessed the lowest percentage of women surveyed who never regret
forgoing employment, i.e. across the population there was, compared to European peers,
a very high percentage of Italian women who wished that they would have worked.
When asked about their reasons for not working, this same group of regretful
women revealed even more about the evolving Italian family. Their responses echo those
of 1975’s question on the limitation of female opportunities, referenced in Chapter 1. On
the 1983 survey, 52.6% of respondents cited either “family responsibilities” or that their
15 European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. Eurobarometer 19: Gender
Roles in the European Community. 1983.
16 European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. Euro-barometer 3:
European Men and Women. 1975; European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis
Sector. Eurobarometer 8: Men, Women, and Work Roles in Europe. 1977.
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husbands would prefer that they do not work as the reason they chose to forego
employment. Compare this to the mere 16.7% of Italian women who cited their
nonworking status as the result of being unable to find suitable employment. 17 This
reinforces the idea that Italian women viewed the traditional family structure as a limiting
force when presented with the option to participate in waged labor.
Yet, the idea that the declining fertility rate is due to labor force participation
alone is overly simplistic. The decision whether to reproduce and/or how many children
to have is not only an economic one: it is an emotional one. When someone decides this,
it reflects the values of the individual, couple, family, and the society as a whole.
Therefore, a more accurate depiction of women’s increase in education and labor
participation’s effect on fertility rate can be made by acknowledging that during the time
period in which fertility declined, women faced a new set of choices. From this field of
choices: the opportunity to graduate college, to have a high paying job, and/or to have a
large, traditional family all emerged as valid. Individuals thus began to make decisions
based on a new set of values that placed women’s autonomy at the forefront. The
women’s movement that helped dismantle much of the patriarchal infrastructure of the
Italian legal code also helped to bring about the idea that work outside of the home was
normal and acceptable for Italian women. 18
Nonetheless, Italian women’s choices remain constrained by the particularities of
the Italian workforce. Existing research draws many connections that are specific to Italy
between why women in the workforce are less likely to have multiple (or any) children,
these being: the lack of part-time employment opportunities, difficulty in re-entry to the
Eurobarometer 19: Gender Roles in the European Community. 1983.
Hellman, Judith Adler. Journeys among Women: Feminism in Five Italian Cities. New York: Oxford UP
(1987), 207.
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workforce, incredibly low access to childcare, and the opportunity cost (foregone wages)
of having a child. These factors create a particular set of institutional limitations to
women in the Italian workforce, and shape the argument that the labor market in Italy is
not conducive to having a large number of children.
In Italy, women dominate university-level education, with one in four women
having attained university-level higher education, compared to only one in six men. 19
Women represent 59% of all graduates from Italian universities, which would seem to
indicate that they are the prime candidates for jobs. 20 Although women continue to
advance in education, Italian young people in general, and women in particular, face
many obstacles within the current labor market structure. Youth unemployment in Italy
currently sits at a staggering 37-year high of almost 42% for Italians between ages 15 and
24. 21 Young people often delay family formation until they are gainfully employed and
able to leave home; a feat more easily said than done in the nation that, if one finds a job,
pays the lowest starting wages of any European Union country. 22 These dire economic
realities affect Italian women even more harshly if they choose to have children.
Italian women see a direct correlation between departing the workforce, even
under mandated maternity leave, and career stagnation. Italian law mandates that women
take five months of maternity leave with 80% salary; however, in 2011 74% of Italian
working mothers stated that taking this maternity leave had a negative impact on their

"Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators: ITALY." Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. Directorate for Education and Skills. 2012.
20 Ibid.
21 Silvera, Ian. "Italy's Youth Unemployment at 42% as Jobless Rate Hits 37-Year High." International
Business Times. 8 Jan. 2014.
22 Shorto, “No Babies.”
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careers, in contrast to the 54% Europe-wide average. 23 This can be attributed to the fact
that pay during maternity leave is not financed by the state or aided by tax revenue:
instead employers are required to pay working mothers during maternity leave, and there
is evidence that they do so reluctantly. 24
Until the practice was outlawed in 2012, employers often mandated that women
pre-sign a resignation letter that would become effective if they were to become
pregnant. 25 Although pregnancy clauses have since been made illegal, nearly 9% of
Italian working mothers state they have been fired from a job due to pregnancy. 26 Italian
women are more hesitant to become mothers while in the workforce because they know
they will be perceived as a burden to their employer, and their job could be placed at
risk. 27 Additionally, Italy also has one of the best retirement plans in the world, with
qualified workers making 75-80% of what they earned once retired. 28 If women choose to
leave the workforce for an extended period of time in order to give birth to and raise one
or multiple children, they run the risk of losing the opportunity for wage growth,
promotions, and ultimately a larger pension.
As Italian women achieve higher levels of education and jobs become scarce, it is
not surprising that working women are increasingly unwilling to forgo their career in
order to have children. It is starkly apparent that the economic penalties that working

European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. Eurobarometer 75.1 EP:
Women in the European Union. 2011.
24 “ Family Policy in the US, Japan, Germany, Italy and France: Parental Leave, Child Benefits/Family
Allowances, Child Care, Marriage/Cohabitation, and Divorce” | Work-Family. 11 Nov. 2013.
25 Zampano, Giada. "'Mancession' Pushes Italian Women Back Into Workforce." The Wall Street
Journal. Nov. 2013.
26 Ibid.
27 “ Family Policy in the US, Japan, Germany, Italy and France: Parental Leave, Child Benefits/Family
Allowances, Child Care, Marriage/Cohabitation, and Divorce.”
28 Shanahan, Angela. "Italy, Land of Earthquakes and Elderly Nonnas." An Abysmal Birth Rate Means
Italians May Die Out. 25 July 2009.
23

41

mothers face in Italy are life-long. Since the 1970s women have had greater opportunity
to serve as independent agents in the Italian economy, and participation in the workforce
has emerged as a valid option. However, as shown, many aspects of the labor market
have failed to evolve in a way that allows for this as well as family formation. This
inflexible labor market structure pushes modern Italian women towards dichotomous
choices: family or career. Unlike in the past, modern Italian women frequently choose to
devalue the traditional family structure and instead prioritize their career and autonomy.
The particularities of the Italian labor market have influenced the fertility patterns
of employed women; however, when fertility reached its lowest point in 1995, female
labor force participation rate in Italy was only 35.7%. Italy currently has the second
lowest female labor force participation rate of the European Union, second only to Malta,
yet it has reached one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. Only 47% of Italian
women engage in paid labor, compared to the OECD 29 average of 60%. 30 This is
indicates the inability of purely economic factors such as female labor force participation
rate and the labor market structure to fully explain the decline in fertility rate across the
last four decades in Italy.
In a piece in the New York Times in 2008 examining the phenomenon of dramatic
fertility decline in southern Italy, Russel Shorto states “The changing role of women,
with greater opportunities for education and employment, the advent of modern birth
control and a new ability to tailor a lifestyle — has been a tension between forces that, in
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many places, have not been reconciled.” 31 This echoes the voices of the women writers
of The 27th Hour who frame the life and lifestyle choices of Italian women as a
“negotiation.” Italian women have choices, but often, due to personal and individual
advancement coupled with institutional stagnation, these choices become trade-offs. For
Italian women even the myth of “having it all” does not exist.

MARRIAGE’S STEADY DECLINE
In addition to changing patterns in Italian women’s attitudes and engagement in
work outside the home, the past four decades have marked significant changes within
Italy’s domestic sphere. A less studied, but equally suggestive trend can be found in the
marriage rate, which has declined in tandem with fertility rate in Italy. The average
number of marriages per 1,000 citizens has fallen from 7.4 per year in 1970 to 3.8 in
2010. 32 The marriage rate’s decline across the same time period as the decline in fertility
is significant because marriage is the well established basis of the traditional family
structure. In 2010, of all children born in Italy, over 78% were born to married women.
Comparatively, the overall European rate for this year was much lower, with only 62% of
children born to married parents. More so than other European countries, in Italy the
majority of childbearing is contained within the marital union, and the two are deeply
related. 33
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In “Is Marriage losing its Centrality in Italy?” Alessandro Rosina and Romina
Fraboni denote the unique importance of marriage in Italy: “Unlike other western
countries, marriage in Italy seems to still have a crucial role at least as far as three
fundamental aspects are concerned: leaving the parental home; union formation; and
reproduction.” 34 Therefore, marriage and reproduction remain crucially linked in the
Italian case. In order to have a more complete understanding of the declining fertility
rate, it is necessary to investigate the transformation of marriage within the country.
Together they reflect the new attitude towards the Italian family, and the rise of new
cultural values.
In addition to a decrease in the overall number of marriages, the way that Italians
are choosing to celebrate marriages reflects a shifting attitude towards the traditional
family structure within the country. Since 1970 there has been a sharp decline in
marriages carried out through religious ceremonies and an increase in percentage of those
carried out through civil proceedings. Due to the Lateran Accords of 1929 between the
Italian government and the Catholic Church (and upheld in 2013), Catholic marriages
conducted in Italy are automatically granted civil validity. 35 Therefore, if a couple
chooses to marry in a Catholic ceremony, the marriage is automatically recognized by the
state. Catholic weddings, however, are increasingly unpopular, with 86% of the drop in
total marriage rate in Italy able to be attributed to the decline in marriages carried out
through religious ceremonies. 36 Comparatively, the percentage of civil ceremonies has
increased across the same time period in which marriage rate and fertility rate have
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declined. The percentage of marriages celebrated by civil rite was insignificant until the
early years of the 1970s, 37 but in 2011 these marriages represented 39% of all unions. 38
The decrease in number of marriages, specifically those carried out through
religious ceremonies, represents the waning influence of Catholicism on individual
behavior, and through this, a rejection of the traditional family model. Although over
80% of the peninsula self-identifies as Catholic, the rise in civic, non-religious
ceremonies indicates that church teachings have ever less influence on Italian’s
behaviors. Rejection of church doctrine, particularly of that related to family formation
choices, reflect Italian’s shifting values that have led to the decline in fertility rate.
Italians are not only consistently getting married at lower rates, but they are
increasingly entering into marital unions later in life. The mean age at first marriage for
women in Italy has steadily increased from 23.9 in 1970 to 31 in 2011, and the median
age at first marriage has reached 34 for Italian men. 39 The rising age at first marriage has
had a significant impact on fertility rate because both male and female Italians tend to
remain in their parental home until they marry. This increasing in age at first marriage
has extended the time of cohabitation between parents and adult children. This results in
young Italians transitioning into marriage and parenthood later in life than they did in
previous decades. 40 Leaving the parental home at a late-in-life time causes Italian youth
to begin the steps to adulthood, including fertility choices, at a delayed rate. The
resulting postponement of childbirth due to later marriage can contribute to low fertility

37 De Rose, Alessandra, Filomena Racioppi, and Anna Laura Zanatta. "Italy: Delayed Adaptation of
Social Institutions to Changes in Family Behaviour." Demographic Research 19 (2008), 677.
38 Marriages in Italy. 2011.
39 Ibid.
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rate for the nation as a whole because it limits window of fertility for women, and it can
also reduce their opportunity to have multiple children. 41
Building on this, children born outside of wedlock are the rarity in Italy. In 2010
“births where the mother’s marital status at the time of birth is other than married”
accounted for 21.5% of all live births. 42 In comparison to the 33.8% rate of its Catholic
counterpart Ireland and the 38.3% rate of the European Union on average, Italy remains a
distinct outlier. 43 Single motherhood is a cultural taboo in Italy with only 32.8% of the
population approving of bearing a child outside of a stable relationship. In contrast,
single motherhood has a 40% rate of acceptance in Ireland and a 46% approval rate in the
European Union as a whole. 44 The low rate of social approval and practice of single
motherhood or reproduction outside of marriage works to constrain fertility to couples in
a marital union. Therefore, marital status is a large determinant of fertility patterns among
Italians. Thus, marriage rate’s decline has played an important role in Italy reaching its
incredibly low fertility rate.
The effects of marriage decline and postponement on fertility are clear; however,
the causes of this decrease in marriage have been influential to fertility decline as well.
Factors such as reaching educational goals and procuring stable employment have been
cited as motivations for postponing or forgoing marriage altogether. Highly educated
women, a rapidly increasing category in Italy, often have a lower economic incentive to
enter into a union. Some women place higher value on individualism than on marriage in

41 Caltabiano, Marcantonio, Maria Castiglioni, and Alessandro Rosina. "Lowest-low Fertility: Signs of a
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44 European Union. European Commission. Public Opinion Analysis Sector. European Values Survey
2008. 2008.

46

terms of personal fulfillment. 45 This complicates the motivation for marriage
postponement (or decision not to marry altogether) by demonstrating that education and
employment are not simply inconveniences that push back the ideal date to marry, but
instead are expressions of women’s desire to obtain autonomy. Similar to the increase in
female labor force participation rate, marriage decline in Italy is a manifestation of a shift
in values towards individual fulfillment and against the traditional family structure, which
has led to the decline in fertility rate.
A large-scale survey of women in Italy revealed that over 40% of unmarried,
childless women were hesitant to enter into a marital union because they feared losing
their freedom. In contrast, only 10% of these women cited financial difficulties as a
barrier to marriage, and only 5% replied that they were averse to marriage because of
incompatibility with their careers. 46 Rosina and Fraboni argue that the declining marriage
rate reflects Italians’ increasingly individualistic desires, asserting that changing marriage
patterns can be seen “as an expression of non-conformist attitude, protest against
authority, and a way of manifesting one’s freedom against conventions.” 47 In contrast to
their pre-1970 counterparts, modern Italians are increasingly willing to forgo traditional
marriage practices, the foundation of the traditional family structure, in order to obtain
and maintain autonomy. The evidence indicates that it is not necessarily the process of
obtaining an education or maintaining a career that serves as a barrier to marriage.
Instead the importance of obtaining autonomy through these processes is of the highest
importance, and entry into marriage can threaten this.

45 Tanturri, Maria L., and Letizia Mencarini. "Childless or Childfree? Paths to Voluntary Childlessness
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Although there were important reforms to family law in the decades leading up to
rapid fertility decline, the legal infrastructure of marriage in Italy still makes divorce very
difficult. Therefore, under a new values system, marriage becomes less desirable,
particularly in terms of maintaining personal autonomy. Therefore, it would be logical
that this set of circumstances would lead to a decline in marriage rates alongside fertility
decline. As explored in Chapter 1, divorce was not obtainable in Italy until 1970. Its
legalization marked a triumph of the woman’s movement and opened a new array of
family choices for the Italian populace. The depletion in risk associated with marriage
through the possibility of divorce could have led to an increase in marriages within Italy;
however, this has not been the case.
Even though divorce has been legal in Italy for the past four decades, rates of
divorce are still comparatively low. Italy’s crude divorce rate in 2009 was 0.9, less than
half the rate of the Europe-wide average. 48 Much of this can be accounted for by the
difficulty of obtaining a divorce in Italy. The way that the divorce process is structured is
meant to reinforce a set of traditional family values within the country. 49 Even when both
parties seek divorce, dissolution of an unhappy union within Italy is particularly lengthy.
After a divorce is requested, the couple must appear before the court for a “compulsory
attempt to reconcile.” From the time of this hearing, there is a mandatory separation
period of three years during which the couple is still legally married before a judge can
grant the divorce. If one spouse contests the divorce, the process becomes even more
arduous and elongated. The attempt to reconcile followed by three years of separation
remain in place, but the dissenting party must prove a reason that the divorce should be
European Union. European Commission. Eurostat. Crude Divorce Rate. 2009.
Todesco, Lorenzo. "A Matter of Number, Age or Marriage? Children and Marital Dissolution in
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granted. The examples of such requirements listed in the statute on divorce are: the other
spouse has been sentenced to life or more than 15 years in prison by a definitive
judgment; the spouse has been sentenced for killing the child or trying to kill the other
spouse or the child; the foreign spouse got the annulment of the marriage abroad or got
married again abroad; or one of the spouses has officially changed sex. 50 The Italian
government has ensured individuals must prove extreme circumstances and endure years
of bureaucracy in order to free themselves from an unhappy union.
This de-romanticized view of traditional marriage and rising pragmatism is not
only expressed through statistical trends, but also in the voices of Italian women. One
post on the women’s issue blog The 27th Hour, “Forever? No. Just as long as you behave
yourself” gives an insight into how modern Italian women perceive the constraints of the
modern marriage legal structure, and encourages a different form of “insurance” for
Italian women. The premise of this post is to promote the benefits of entering into a civil
union as opposed to entering into marriage. Civil unions in Italy allow heterosexual
couples to enter into a municipal agreement that affords them certain rights as a couple
such as allocation of housing and authority in a medical emergency. Unlike marriage,
this type of union allows for a party to more easily regain legal independence if a partner
begins to treat him or her badly or the partnership is no longer happy. The author denotes
the way in which the Italian marriage system intertwines “family vines” and if one party
seeks to withdraw, or even if both parties seek to withdraw, the results are rarely even,
and are often economically and emotionally unfavorable to women. 51
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The post goes on to urge Italian women to remember that “economic
independence is in fact the only weapon with which women can defend the dignity and
self-determination and, above all, with which they can expect to be treated as equals —
Even in love, let us not forget.” 52 This perspective is echoed in another 27th Hour post,
“Divorce Italian Style. Why it is important (for everyone) that women work” written by a
divorce attorney who advises, “if you have a daughter, teach them, yes, to keep the house
in order, but spur her above all else to be economically independent… For a woman,
there is no better insurance.” 53 These ominous warnings take on more weight when the
author presents that upon becoming divorced, Italian women with young children in Italy
have almost a 16% chance of becoming impoverished. 54 The high propensity for married
Italian women to sacrifice employment in order to engage in unpaid labor in the
household can have dire economic effects when these women become divorced. 55
The difficulty of obtaining a divorce, whether contested or by mutual consent,
lends explanatory power as to why Italians are marrying at lower rates and entering into
marital unions at increasingly older ages. Although citing the difficulty of divorce as a
barrier to marriage is a distinctly un-romanticized view of this choice made by Italian
young people, when placed alongside other factors that contribute to low marriage rates,
a clearer picture of the values of Italians in relation to family formation emerges. The
desire to reach a high level of education, career stability, and difficulty in dissolving an
unhappy union clearly influence marriage choices. Late departure from parental home
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and delays in family formation, particularly in Italy where childbearing is often
constrained to marital unions, further contribute to a lower fertility rate.
As the desire and demand for personal autonomy has risen, Italians have
increasingly weighed the practicality and permanence of marriage. This is manifested in
changing marriage patterns: rising age at first marriage, decline in the percentage of
marriages with religious ceremonies, and a decrease in the number of marriages
altogether. These shifts indicate a growing devaluation of the traditional family structure.
The trend of a rising desire for autonomy and a decrease in importance placed on
traditional institutions has manifested itself in new family patterns both in marriage and
fertility.

HOUSEWORK AS UNPAID LABOR
As examined, there have been important shifts in both public and domestic
behavior of Italians alongside fertility decline. In the cases of female labor force
participation rate and marriage rate, the rising desire for autonomy and decline in
influence of the concept of the traditional family have been shown to wield influence on
choices related to employment, marriage, and fertility. Although attitudes and behaviors
in these realms have been evolving across the past four decades, in Italy, gender relations
within the family, particularly in terms of household labor, remain persistently
antiquated. The burden of unpaid labor tips unfavorably on Italian women, and this
asymmetric gender relationship has played a significant role in the decline of fertility rate
in Italy.
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More so than any other Western European country, a distinct aspect of the 1970s
Italian women’s movement was the demand for wages for housework. This movement
was an effort to address the problem of doppio lavoro (“double work”) in which all
Italian women, even women who engaged in paid labor, continued to shoulder the
overwhelming responsibility of home maintenance and family care. 56 This cornerstone of
the traditional family structure had long been recognized as a problem. The high rates of
dissatisfaction among Italian (nonworking) housewives indicated by survey data in
Chapter 1 reinforce this. Unfortunately, equality of labor in the home has not evolved or
equalized at the same rate of paid labor for women. In "Italy's Path to Very Low
Fertility,” David Kertzer recognizes the way in which “very low fertility in advanced
countries today is the outcome of a conflict or inconsistency between high levels of
gender equity in individual-oriented social institutions and sustained gender inequity in
family-oriented social institutions.” 57 The continuance of the uneven burden of unpaid
labor placed on women and the problem of doppio lavoro lie at the root of housework’s
influence on fertility in Italy.
In “Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behavior,”
Alessandra De Rose, Filomena Raciopi, and Anna Laura Zanatta lay the foundation for
the complexity of the state of gender relations outside of and within the Italian household
across the time period in which fertility has declined:

In Italy, too, during the last 40 years, the public gender system changed in an even
sense: women now have access to any profession, they achieve higher educational
level than men, and when employed they work almost as hard as men, especially
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before entering motherhood. At the same time, however, the couple’s sharing of
housework is heavily unbalanced – not only when the woman is a housewife (in
the traditional logic of ‘job sharing’), but even when she works full time. Women
need to and want to work in order to avoid an income reduction as well as a loss
of role and identity. At the same time, spending long hours on household chores,
without any significant help from the husband, contributes to making low fertility
more than a choice. 59
The mismatch between women’s advancement in public spheres such as education and
employment is counteracted by ongoing asymmetric gender roles in the home. If a
woman wishes to maintain a manageable work-life balance, often the solution is to limit
fertility.
As a part of the 2011 Eurobarometer survey “Women in the European Union,”
when asked what would best enable a balance in private life and working life, 40% of
Italians responded with “encouraging a better balance between women and men in the
sharing of domestic tasks and care of children and dependents.” 60 Italians chose this
response at a rate nearly 10% higher than the European average. They also did so more
than the other provided options: a more flexible work atmosphere and easier access to
childcare outside of the home. This is particularly demonstrative of the effect that
unequal household responsibilities between Italian men and women has played in fertility
decline. Lack of a flexible labor market structure and low access to and significant cost
of childcare services have been two of the most heavily cited reasons for female labor
force participation’s influence on fertility decline in Italy. From these survey responses,
however, Italian women reveal ways in which inequality in unpaid household labor
intertwine with paid labor and fertility. These women demonstrate an awareness of the
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immensely unequal distribution of responsibilities within households, and recognize that
this inequality wields substantial influence on fertility choices.
Housework seems like a relatively straightforward concept; however, before
understanding the role that it plays in Italian in fertility decline, it is necessary to address
the specific nature of housework and maintenance of the household in Italy. Housework
in Italy encompasses daily domestic chores such as cooking meals for the family, doing
laundry, and cleaning the home. To a westernized reader these seem like straightforward
tasks; however, the style and standard of living in Italy ensure that these are significant
undertakings. For example, even in 2013, less than half of households (45.3%) had a
dishwasher, meaning that in most Italian households all dishes were hand washed. 61
Additionally, only around 4% of Italian households have a dryer, making laundry a time
consuming and labor-intensive process. 62
Italy’s food culture, although a source of pride for the nation, results in hours of
additional work for women daily. Shopping is generally an everyday activity due to
Italians’ taste for exceptionally fresh food and the small size of household refrigerators.
The tradition of cooking from scratch has maintained its strength into the twenty-first
century, but shopping for and preparing these meals is a time consuming burden: one that
falls disproportionately on women. 63
On average, Italian women spend 326 minutes (5.4 hours) per day on domestic
work, whereas men, on average, spend only 103 minutes (1.7 hours) participating in
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unpaid labor daily. This places Italy as having one of the lowest levels of male
participation in domestic work, and one of the highest disparities in household
responsibilities of all developed countries. 64
Beyond household maintenance, housework in the Italian case encompasses care
for dependents, which can include children as well as the parents of both spouses. In the
decades before rapid fertility decline, cohabitation and close relationships between
generations were actually favorable towards reproduction because grandparents were able
to aid mothers in care for children. With increasing gaps between generations, however,
a more common scenario in modern Italy is that instead of being able to lend a hand in
childcare, aging parents are in need of care by their offspring during the same time that
these individuals (generally women) are responsible for caring for a very young child. 65
Modern Italian women are finding themselves as a part of a “sandwich
generation,” engaging in care on two fronts on top of their already busy lives. 66
Interdependence between generations and the responsibilities of adult children are
particularly pronounced within Italy. This is partially due to adult children’s propensity
to remain in the same town (often in the same neighborhood) as their parents, but also
due to deeply entrenched cultural norms. As a part of the 2008 European Values Survey,
89% of Italian respondents indicated that it is a child’s responsibility to care for their
aging parents. 67 This mindset may be one of the few things that allows for a livable
standard of care for the huge number of graying Italians, who have a life expectancy of
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83 years. Italy operates on a welfare model for elderly care, but because of the small
percentage of GDP channeled towards this issue, care for aging parents “fundamentally
rests on the shoulders of the family, in particular on the daughter.” 68 The burden of
household and dependent care being placed primarily on women has created an
environment that is hostile to large families, because women’s time is consistently spread
too thin.
Even in an Italian household where the woman does not participate in the paid
workforce, and the couple does not have children, the woman will spend almost 6 hours
more per week doing unwaged work activities than her husband does in paid and unpaid
labor combined. This labor gap only becomes wider and more burdensome on women
when they are engaged in labor outside of the home and/or have children. Married
women without children who take part in paid labor still spend on average 12 hours more
per week on unpaid labor than their husbands. In dual-income households the presence
of children increases the amount of time spent by women on unpaid labor by 26%: a
substantial rise in an already a significantly unequal division of responsibilities. 69
Italian husbands generally suffer no loss in available leisure time nor increase in
hours devoted to unpaid work when a child is born. 70 This minimal change in a
husband’s domestic undertakings upon fatherhood is supported by the fact that new
fathers make up only 14% of Italians seeking parental leave, even though they would be
entitled to 3 months away from work making 80% of their salary. 71 This pattern of
behavior demonstrates an underlying assumption that women will absorb the extra labor
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associated with child rearing. Within the family, therefore, Italian women’s hesitancy to
have children in order to maintain a degree of independence and free time is
understandable. Of all of the categories of unpaid labor, the number of children within a
marriage is arguably the most easily controlled.
Studies of Italy have shown that the more a woman works (both in paid and
unpaid labor) the less likely she is to want more children. Faced with heavy burdens at
home and huge amounts of time devoted to unpaid labor, Italian women are hesitant to
increase their workload by having children. There is evidence, however, that more
egalitarian gender roles within the household create an environment more favorable
towards fertility. Households in which unpaid labor is shared more evenly between
spouses tend to have more children than homes in which women who do more than
seventy-five percent of the housework and child-care. 72 Such households in Italy,
however, are few and far between.
Ideologically, through decades of reinforcement, Italian women believe that it is
their responsibility to shoulder housework, just as men believe it is not their role. Social
reproduction and household well-being depend on the current, unequal system in which
men’s ability to participate in the labor force is supplemented by women’s work in the
domestic sphere, even when women engage in paid labor as well. 73 Increasingly,
however, women are not willing to burden themselves with additional children in order to
comply with what would be seen as traditional reproductive patterns along with this
responsibility to sustain her home, husband and, potentially, aging parents. 74 Lowered
fertility, therefore, is partially an effect of the persistence of traditional gender roles
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within the home and modern Italian women’s unwillingness to further increase their share
of this unequal burden through childbearing.

Implications
Three factors that are as much about attitudes as economics help to illuminate the
societal institutions and individual attitudes that have shaped the choices modern Italian
women make. When examined together, conditions surrounding modern female
participation in the waged workforce, entry into marriage, and gendered division of
unpaid labor reveal shifting cultural values within a an often rigid ideological and
institutional infrastructure that, in turn, has led to low fertility in Italy.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

This examination of the decline in fertility rate in Italy has sought to complicate
the existing research in the field through examining the particularities of the Italian case.
Relationships among marriage, female labor force participation rate, gender relations, and
familial responsibilities have been previously examined for their causal relationship to
fertility decline, as demonstrated in the introduction. This study, however, has
specifically focused on these factors as a manifestation of the same force driving low
fertility in Italy, this being: a meaningful shift in cultural values, particularly those of
Italian women, in which the traditional family structure is viewed as less favorable within
a new field of choices. Instead of presenting the shift in Italian fertility patterns as the
natural result of a larger set of driving economic forces, this study sheds light on the way
in which Italian individuals, specifically women, have made the choice to have fewer
children. Data has been used to reveal the cultural changes at the root of this mindset and
the societal structures encourage its continuation.
Chapter 1 presented the time period across which there was significant femalefriendly progress in legislation that affected Italian women. For the first time, women
had access to legalized divorce, birth control, and abortion. This decade, from the late
1960s to late 1970s, marked the first time in which Italian women were able to control

their own fertility as single women or within marriage. The Italian feminist movement
played a large role in helping women to gain these advances within the Italian legal
structure, and the demands of the Italian women’s movement shed light on to the specific
conditions of life as an Italian woman during this time period. Feminist writings and
Eurobarometer survey data reveal that women desired to be more active in the paid
workforce and that they perceived the Italian family structure led to personal limitations.
This was a decade of change that not only represented a manifestation of Italian women’s
changing desires and expectations, but also served as a catalyst for further changes in
societal values. New choices were available to Italian women, and alongside declining
fertility, the next four decades would mark shifts in marriage age and rates, women in the
paid workforce, and gender relations across the peninsula.
The first factor examined is the one most cited by existing research to have caused
fertility decline in Italy: the increase in female labor force participation rate across the
same time period as fertility decline. Data was presented to bolster the view that instead
of being seen as a cause of fertility decline, increase in female participation in the Italian
workforce, similar to fertility decline, represents a rejection of the traditional family
structure. Across the past four decades Italian women have reached higher levels of
education and have engaged in paid labor at higher rate, but this alone cannot account for
fertility decline. With a female labor force participation rate of only 38.2%, Italy is
amongst the lowest in all of Europe. Therefore reconciling the argument of this increase
in female paid labor with one of the lowest fertility rates in the entire world becomes
more complicated. The conditions of the Italian labor market (such as difficulty in reentry after motherhood and limited access to childcare) present women with a set of
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institutionalized challenges if they wish to have a family and a career. Since the decade
of change, women have increasingly put their autonomy at the forefront, resulting in
fewer children and higher employment. This bolsters the argument that female paid labor
participation, like fertility decline, is better categorized as an effect of changing values
and choices of the Italian society.
Building on this, the relationship between marriage and fertility and the shifts in
both since 1970 were examined. Marriage patterns in Italy have been shifting across the
same time period as fertility decline in Italy, and can account for fertility decline while
also being demonstrative of new societal values. The transformation of Italian marriage
represents a morphing of the Italian family structure. The decline in marriage rate in Italy
was shown to influence fertility because childbearing overwhelmingly occurs within
marital unions within the country, so fewer marriages leads to fewer children.
Additionally, the propensity for Italians to enter into marriage later in life can limit the
number of children able to be had by a couple because they have fewer fertile years at
their disposal.
The causes of the decline in marriage rate, however, support the assertion that a
meaningful shift in cultural values has occurred in Italy. Survey data and blog posts from
The 27th Hour reveal the way in which delaying marriage or forgoing marriage altogether
is a manifestation of women’s desire for autonomy. The difficult and lengthy process of
obtaining divorce also lends explanatory power to why Italians tend to marry at
increasingly older ages. Un-romanticized practicality has been shown in many cases to
trump sentimentalized notions of marriage and traditional marriage patterns across the
peninsula. The connection between marriage and fertility in Italy has been firmly
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established, and it has been pinpointed previously as a cause and effect relationship. This
study, however, emphasizes that changing marriage patterns are characteristic of a new
set of values in Italy that places the individual at the forefront. Therefore, the trend of
modern Italians to postpone or forgo marriage demonstrates that conforming to the
traditional family model has become increasingly less important when weighed against
autonomy.
Italian women’s perspective on marriage as meaning a loss of personal freedom is
made more clear through a deeper examination of gender roles within marital unions.
The subsequent section, “Housework as Unpaid Labor,” reveals the way in which the
ideological attitude of Italians towards unpaid labor places an incredibly heavy burden on
women. Data reveal that even without children and without engaging in paid labor, the
unequal balance of household responsibilities in Italian homes ensures that women have
less weekly leisure time than men. Care for dependents, food preparation, laundry,
cleaning, shopping, and a wide array of other responsibilities have been shown to fall
solely on women. From this deeply entrenched societal practice, women are placed at a
crossroads where choosing to engage in paid labor or choosing to have children increases
the amount of time they spend on labor by a significant amount. Through this, the idea
that forgoing marriage or, within marriage, forgoing children is a choice that stems from
increasingly individualized attitudes is made more clear. This is not to say that Italian
women are selfish or more demanding of independence than women of other nations, but
to emphasize that the specific societal infrastructure of Italy in many instances pushes
women into starkly dichotomous choices.
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Throughout each factor examined in this study there is evidence of stagnation of
female-friendly progress that was initiated in the 1970s. As demonstrated, evolving
opinions, desires, and actions of women are mismatched with institutions, ideologies, and
deeply entrenched cultural norms that are not evolving at the same rate. Female labor
force participation rates are still low, and women still face many barriers to having equal
participation alongside men. Roles within marriage remain uneven, there has been little
advancement in gendered household responsibilities, and divorce is difficult to obtain.
Increasingly, Italian women wish to engage in paid labor, but recognize the extreme
difficulty of having both a job and a child. Ideologically, Italian women believe that they
are responsible for all housework, but they are increasingly unwilling to burden
themselves with additional children in order to comply with what would be seen as
traditional reproductive patterns along with this. What Italian women cannot do, or at
least what they perceive they cannot do, is to change the ideological and institutional
infrastructure of the country. Individual women cannot choose for society to view
household division of labor differently. They cannot decide that re-entry to the
workforce would/should become easier. They cannot decide that access to childcare will
become easier or less expensive. What individual women can do, however, is control
their own personal level of education, personal involvement in the workforce, marital
status, and number of children.
When examining fertility decline, the difficulties of maintaining career and family,
and the particularities of the Italian infrastructure must be acknowledged; however,
depicting fertility decline as a trend of a structural nature or the natural effect of some
vast process denies individuals agency and voice. Therefore, fertility decline, along with

63

the shifting factors this study has examined alongside it, do not represent a series of
causes and effects. Instead, these shifts reveal changing values among individuals,
families, and ultimately society as a whole. This conclusion acknowledges the intricacies
of Italian society and reflects the complexities inherent in choices related to family
formation.
The findings of this research open up the possibility for additional examination of
the cultural causes and implications of fertility decline. In addition to this, further study
of the particular societal constraints faced by Italian women could help to discover ways
in which implementation of changes in labor market structure or encouragement of equal
household responsibilities could help Italy to avoid a population crisis. Research that
acknowledges the specific nature of fertility decline in Italy as opposed to a cross-cultural
approach is more likely to achieve comprehensive solutions and effective results.
Additionally, due to the immediacy of demographic changes in Italy, continual
examination of this topic is necessary to stay abreast of developments in Italian society
and fertility.
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